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I 
There are three problems of major importance in theo· 
retical economics. One is the problem of price; another is 
that of interest; and yet another is that of dynamics-the 
problem of business changes especially. On the problem of 
price, as Schumpeter once remarked, there is, on the whole, 
a fair agreement of views. As regards details, of course, 
supply constitutes the most impenetrable part of economic 
theory, and opinion is divided on duopoly price, while con· 
flicting opinions are upheld by digerent economists, equally 
unyielding, on the theory of marginal productivity. Generally 
speaking, however, it may fairly be said that, in the matter 
of form, the general equilibrium theory has been established, 
and, in substance, the marginal utility theory has gained 
general recognition. The problem of dynamics affords virgin 
soil in economic theory. Although it is undeniable that it 
has been quite extensively dealt with by economists of the 
classical school and downwards, it can hardly be said to 
have been treated of as yet in a sufficiently systematic way. 
Fluctuations in the state of business have been the subject 
of many studies of late, but it is open to doubt whether 
such studies can rightly be regarded as forming part of 
economic theory. It clearly belongs to the future to develop 
the theory of dynamics properly. On the other hand, the 
problem of interest has been receiving attention for a great 
many years, and yet there is such a medley of conflicting 
opinions that no conclusive theory has yet emerged. Not 
that the efforts of economists have been lacking in this field. 
Bohm·Bawerk, for instance, devoted his enormous energy 
and rate ability to the study of this problem. Fisher and 
_.- ._----- ---------_ .. _-
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Landry also wrote excellent books on the subject. No equal 
amount of energy has, indeed, been expended in the enuncia· 
tion of the theory of value and price. That there still exist 
so many divergent views, testifies, no doubt, to the great 
difficulty of the problem and the complexity of the con· 
nected phenomena. 
I have been studying this difficult problem for fifteen 
years, and have had occasion to publish my views on Op· 
penheimer's monopoly theory, Clark's marginal productivity 
theory, Schumpeter's dynamic theory, and Bohm·Bawerk's 
agio theory. I was particularly strongly impressed by 
Schum peter's dynamic theory, of which I have been a staunch 
supporter since 1921. While my support of this theory has 
remained firm, my attitude towards other theories has under· 
gone frequent changes. At first, I supported the dynamic 
theory against all other theories, but during the last few 
years I have, while supporting that theory, held that interest 
is caused by powers. In other words, I take the line that 
the dynamic theory and the power theory are not irrecon-
cilable, but are complementary to each other. When, some 
time ago, Professor Schum peter lectured on his theory of 
interest at Kobe Commercial University, I observed that the 
Professor's theory would allow of interpretation as an ex· 
ploitation theory, an observation which, I think, surprised 
the Professor. Since the spring of 1932, I have been en· 
grossed in the study of Bohm·Bawerk's theory of interest'rate, 
and as a result I have conceived the idea of improving my 
theory by revising and transforming Bohm·Bawerk's theory 
of interest·rate in the light of the power theory. 
It was Lindberg's criticism of Biihm·Bawerk's theory of 
interest·rate that suggested this idea to me. Lindberg con· 
tends that Biihm-Bawerk's theory cannot be accepted as it 
stands, declaring that it leads, in the ultimate, to the minimum 
wage theory. Let me enlarge on this point a little further. 
Bohm·Bawerk takes the line that where the productivity of 
production goods, or the measure of surplus profit (die Skala 
der Mehrertragnisse), is fixed and the amount of capital and 
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the amount of labour are also fixed, both interest and wages 
become settled at definite points. Lindberg, however, dissents 
and contends that it is impossible for interest to be fixed 
at the equilibrium point as claimed by Bohm·Bawerk. He 
asserts that wages will then settle at the lowest point, and 
interest will be fixed proportionately. In my opinion, Lind· 
berg's equilibrium point is not the real equilibrium point. 
I concluded that so long as the economy is pure in my 
sense and there is no action of powers, there can be no 
equilibrium interest. Thus, I introduced a relation of power 
as a factor indispensable to the determination of an equili· 
brium interest. 
My argument, however, lacked something in its theoret· 
ical structure, and I could not but feel that it could hardly 
be upheld stoutly against all kinds of adverse criticism. As 
already stated, Lindberg's point of view has both positive 
and negative phases. I renounced its positive phase, but 
held to its negative phase, namely, the negation of the equili· 
brium interest as claimed by Bohm·Bawerk. But I went a 
little too far in recognising the latter, and had to retrace my 
steps. I now admit that under Bohm·Bawerk's assumption, 
his interest in equilibrium must be the real equilibrium 
interest and that accordingly the economic intervention of 
power is by no means an indispensable condition of the 
determination of an equilibrium interest. 
I am going to publish shortly a book entitled, "Studies 
in Theories of Interest." It is a collection of my studies in 
theories of interest-BOhm·Bawerk's theory of interest in 
particular. In this book, I take the stand that an equili· 
brium interest is possible only where there is the intervention 
of social powers. But as the object of my studies described 
in the book is to promote the understanding and digestion 
of various theories hitherto enunciated on the subject, and 
not to set forth my point of view in concrete form, I think 
the book will have its own raison d'etre. irrespective of the 
views I hold myself. 
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original idea of transforming Bohm·Bawerk's theory of 
interest·rate along the lines of the power theory, but I hold 
strongly to the view that interest is due to powers. Nor 
do I see any reason to abandon this viewpoint. I propose 
to formulate a theory of interest by accepting Bohm·Bawerk's 
theory of interest·rate as it stands -on the conditions he 
assumes, while not renouncing Schumpeter's dynamic theory, 
and by linking them to the power theory. Not that I 
am attempting to piece these theories together into a sort 
of mosaic. As I believe that I have got hold of something 
fundamental which these theories have in common, I am 
making bold to synthesise them into an organic body. 
When I refer to Bohm·Bawerk's theory of interest·rate 
here, I mean the latter half of his positive theory of interest, 
in which he deals with "the determination of interest·rate 
in the market." In my opinion, there is no necessary theo· 
retical connection between the former half of his theory, in 
which three causes of interest are described, and the latter 
half. My endorsement of his theory of interest·rate does 
not necessarily mean my support of his view on three causes 
of interest. 
II 
The above explanation, however, will be hardly sufficient 
to make clear the characteristics of my theory of interest or 
the position it occupies among the various theories of interest. 
It appears that the productivity theory has been rendered 
invalid by Bohm·Bawerk's criticism of it. The productivity 
theory as hitherto advanced has done nothing beyond reo 
cognising technical and physical productivity in capital. 
It has failed to go a step further and demonstrate that. 
capital has value'producing power, that is, the power to 
produce value which is more than cost or amortization. If 
the principle is to be accepted that, the value of the product 
being imputed to production goods, the value of both be· 
comes equal (this is what is called the cost principle), no 
room is left for the creation of surplus by production. 
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Such seems to have become the generally accepted inter· 
pretation since Bohm·Bawerk. From this point of view, it 
would seem to be futile to attempt to explain interest by 
productivity. 
Schumpeter's dynamic theory is the cost principle-the 
theory of imputation-carried to its logical conclusion. If 
the value of the product is wholly attributable to production 
goods, it must be absolutely impossible for any disparity in 
value, and accordingly surplus, to exist between the two. 
lf so, surplus can only be formed in a dynamic state. This 
argument is, in my opinion, irrefutable. The only point 
requiring elucidation is what kind of dynamic state it is in 
which surplus is created. In this respect, I think my view 
is in contlict with Scbumpeter's own theory of interest. I 
maintain that the perfect operation of the principle is possible 
only where there exists no power in the shape of class rela· 
tion. Where class relation exists, its operation is checked 
to a certain extent. If it is checked to any extent, the value 
of the product must be higher than that of production goods. 
Capital, we may say, has productivity to that extent. Let 
me repeat that the question of whether or not capital has 
productivity is substantially the question of whether class 
relation ·rules or not. If class relation rules, capital has 
productivity. Nay, it may he claimed that capital is capital 
because it has productivity, so that capital is capital only 
because class relation rules. 
From this point of view, I regard the attempt to explain 
interest by productivity as no other than an attempt to ex· 
plain interest by class relation. This explanation may not 
yet be sufficient. If the value of production goods is lowered 
to a point below productivity by reason of class relation, 
will not the value of the product (namely, value producing 
power) come down to the value of production goods? This 
conception appears possible from the fact that competition 
brings the price of the product down to the price of pro· 
duction goods. But the reply to this Question must be in 
the negative. No matter what is the value of production 
----.-~ 
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goods, the value -of the product does not follow its lead. It 
has its own way of settling down. I shall defer to a later 
occasion a detailed discussion of this point, but it may be 
replaced by the assertion that physical productivity means 
value productivity. In short, the relation in which the value 
of production goods and the value of the product stand to 
each other is this: It is the former that follows the latter, 
not the latter that follows the former. Consequently, if 
anything occurs to interrupt this sequence, there necessarily 
arises a lasting disparity between the two factors. 
As already stated, the productivity theory of interest 
has been abandoned since Biihm·Bawerk's criticism, but I 
am inclined to think, despite the present situation, that if 
productivity is regarded as the result of the disturbance of 
the process of imputation by class relation, productivity 
furnishes a really effective clue by which interest can be 
adequately explained. In this sense, my theory is, in a 
manner, a revived form of the productivity theory of interest, 
which seems to have been torn to pieces by the criticism 
levelled against it by Bohm·Bawerk and Schumpeter. 
In spite of his very scathing criticism of the productivity 
theory, however, Bohm·Bawerk's own theory of interest-rate 
cannot but be looked upon as a sort of productivity theory. 
The "measure of surplus profit" (die Skala der Mehr-
ertriignisse) which he assumes in his theory is no other than 
productivity itself, and without this assumption, his explana-
tion would be void. It must, fUrther, be noted that this 
assumption lacks any convincing justification. Its justifica-
tion is sought merely in experience. This incidentally shows 
that the theory of interest cannot be formed without assum-
ing a certain state of productivity and that an adequate 
explanation of interest is impossible, apart from the pro-
ductivity theory. How is it, then, that the premise of 
class relation means the existence of the productivity of 
capital. 
-~--~--------------- ---- ----
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III 
I put a very wide construction on power relation. Class 
relation is interpreted as a relation of this kind. This class 
relation nowadays takes the form of the rival existence of 
the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and consequently the 
relation between enterprises capable of utilising capital 
and labourers. Because of class relation, economics now 
assumes the shape of Vorschussiikonomie (advance pay· 
ment of wages) and this Vorschussiikonomie embodies pay· 
ments attended by surplus. To explain it in another way. 
If labourers are fully provided with the means of livelihood, 
they will not have to get a part of the price of the product, 
before it is finished, as advance payment of their wages. 
Again, if their social position is sufficiently high, the amount 
of payments in advance will not be so small that, as is 
actually the case, it is barely enough to support the Iiveli· 
hood of proletarians. 
In this regard, I cannot but recall Gustav Schmoller's 
explanation of the level of wages. He says: "In the level of 
wages is reflected a relation of power between social classes. 
Class disparities, transferred in national consciousness, firmly 
established, and expressed in the modes of living, and 
which change but slowly and almost imperceptibly, are 
reflected especially in the level of the entire wages especially, 
as in the distribution of the entire income, or in the differ· 
ential wages for various groups of labourers."" If wages 
are determined by such class relation and if, consequently, 
the purely economic process of imputation is not fully 
operative jn. determining them, then-and then only-is it 
possible for capital to acquire productivity. There can be 
no productivity of capital unless there is Vorschussiikonomie 
and the consequent low level of wages, or, in other words, 
the interruption of the process of imputation. In so far as 
1) Gustav Schmoller, Allgemeine Volkswirtschaftslehre, Zweiter TeH. 6 
te Autl. 1904, S. 763. 
---- .-- ----
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attention is confined to a purely economic relation between 
equals, independently of the consideration of the relation of 
capital (Kapitalverhiiltnis), it is impossible to conceive a 
lasting productivity of capital. 
It is by no means a new idea to explain interest by a 
relation of power. To cite contemporary theories only, 
Stolzmann and Tugan-Baranowsky are clearly of this school 
of. thought. I shall pass over Stolzmann's theory, which, not 
being based On the marginal utility theory, is too far reo 
moved from the stand I take. Tugan-BaranowSky, while 
supporting the marginal utility theory, attaches prime im· 
portance to powers in his explanation of how wages are 
determined. But since wages represent the price of one of 
production goods and consequently form a factor in the cost 
of production, fluctuations in wages must necessarily affect 
the price and amount of the product. His theory, which 
takes no account of this mutual relationship, and which 
fails to make clear how far the cost principle operates, 
must be described as inadequate. If Stolzmann's theory is 
anterior to the marginal utility theory, that of Tugan-
Baranowsky is anterior to the equilibrium theory. Gustav 
Schmoller's theory, to which reference has already been 
made, is merely a fragmentary description; it can hardly be 
regarded as theoretically constituted. TheoreticaIly, I propose 
to give to the power theory of interest a form posterior to 
the equilibrium theory. 
Tugan-Baranowsky makes nO attempt to demonstrate 
why the price of the product, determined by marginal utility, 
is greater than that of production goods. He assumes from 
the start that it is greater. He does not seem to think that 
it is matter requiring proof. Marx, who likewise attaches 
importance to class relation, as is well-known, assures and 
demonstrates by his labour value theory that the product 
obtains a price greater than the wages which are determined 
by the cost of the production of labour power. So long, 
however, as the labour value theory is discarded, the greater 
price of the product, namely, the superiority of the price of 
----------- ---
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the product, caIls for due illustration. The answer to the 
question why it is greater will be given, I think, when it is 
made clear, on the one hand, that the price of production 
goods cannot foIlow the lead of the price of the product due 
to the interruption of the fuIl operation of the process of 
imputation by class relation, and, on the other hand, that 
the cost principle cannot operate, independently of imputa' 
tion, and that consequently the price of the product does not 
foIlow the price of production goods, which may be on a 
lower level. To affirm the latter point seems to point to 
the conclusion that Schumpeter's dynamic theory cannot be 
supported in its present form. In short, in order to enable 
the power theory posterior to the equilibrium theory to 
explain interest effectually, it is necessary to clear up two 
phases, positive and negative, in regard to the superiority 
of the price of the product. Negatively, it must be made 
clear that, no matter how far competition is carried on, the 
price of production goods does not follow the lead of the 
price of the product and that consequently the surplus that 
is created continues in existence. Positively, it must be 
shown that the price of the product does not follow the lead 
of that of production goods, and that the former creates 
surplus by determinant factors of its own. 
In Schumpeter's dynamic theory, it is maintained that 
the processes of imputation and competition take place con· 
currently, and that while the price of the product is reduced 
by competition, the price of production goods is raised by 
the process of imputation, so that profit becomes absolutely 
eliminated through pressure from both sides. As I have 
stated already, I do not recognise such action in competi· 
tion. 
IV 
I have now reached the stage at which I feel called upon 
to make clear in what sense I support the dynamic theory. 
I admit that there is no interest in the static state, pro· 
vided 'it represents a state in which free competition has 
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been thoroughly carried on, and the imputation of the price 
of the product to that of production goods has perfectly 
taken place. But in actual economies, there is no perfect 
operation of the process of imputation. Let me offer some 
explanation as to why this is so. 
The theory of imputation is invariably connected with 
the world of value, and it is probably permissible to extend 
this connection to the field of price. Even if value is attri· 
buted to a certain commodity, it will not necessarily follow 
that this value becomes price and actually be paid. Now 
suppose that the price of 100 is obtainable by the action of 
AB. If it is assumed that the value of currency correspond· 
ing to one unit of price is one, it means that 100 of this 
value is obtainable by it. If the value of B is 30, that is, 
if it is assumed that B is always obtainable by paying the 
value of 30, the value of A is 70. But whether or not this 
value will manifest itself as the price of 70 depends on 
economic conditions. Value of a certain size does not always 
express itself in a price of exactly the same size. In the 
present instance, the value of the produce must be attributed 
to production goods; value imputation will be thoroughly 
and perfectly executed. It is nevertheless another matter 
whether a price of the same size will be paid for them. 
Where a price of this size is not paid, the imputation of 
price is not thorough; it is disturbed. In the present case, 
then, it may be said that although the imputation of value 
from the product to production goods is effected thoroughly, 
the imputation of price does not take place with the same 
thoroughness. But why is such the case? 
Schumpeter ascribes it to a new combination. To ex· 
plain it with special emphasis on negative phases, he says, 
it is because a new combination does not spread quickly, or 
there is not a quick reversion to it. It is, however, possible 
that even where this reversion is perfect, there will be no 
perfect imputation of price. This can easily be inferred 
from the theoretical structure of Btihm·Bawerk's theory of 
interest·rate. -So long as there is a certain limit to the 
- ----------------------
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amount of capital, there must be surplus left, no matter how 
far a new combination may become disseminated. Should 
the cost principle cause the price of the product to follow 
the lead of the price of production goods in this case, this 
contention would be undermined, but otherwise it must be 
accepted. The conclusion is then inevitable that a shortage 
of capital prevents a thorough imputation of price and brings 
surplus into existence. But it may further be asked whether 
there is not something which makes this imputation lasting 
and necessary. If surplus is due to a shortage of capital, it 
will disappear the instant capital is replenished. In this 
sense, it is temporary and fortuitous. In my opinion, so long 
as class relation is assumed, it is possible to discern in it 
such factors as render surplus a matter of necessity. I am 
of opinion that there exist factors which prevent the perfect 
imputation of price to production goods. The most funda· 
mental of them is a relation of power-a factor which is 
not purely economic. If this obstacle is removed, and if the 
accumulation of capital takes place without let or hindrance, 
the price of the product will be wholly attributed to produc· 
tion goods, and there will be no surplus at all. 
Needless to say, there is a pretty wide difference be· 
tween a theory of interest so constituted and that of Schum-
peter, but it may well be termed a dynamic theory in that 
it maintains that interest is possible in a dynamic state 
only-not in a static state. It is true that it differs greatly 
from Schumpeter's point of view in that it attributes the 
imperfect imputation to a relat.ion of power, considering that 
it traces surplus to imputation, it may be regarded as an· 
other form of the dynamic theory. 
When I said that "the explanation of interest on the 
basis of power partakes somewhat of the character of the 
dynamic theory," or that the dynamic theory admits of 
interpretation as the power theory, I had such circumstances 
in mind. Schumpeter's dynamic theory-as an extension or 
a revision of Btihm-Bawerk's theory of interest- leaves the 
action of power entirely out of consideration, and explains 
-_.- -----... -- ----
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how interest can come into being, independently of its ac-
tion_ It assumes that interest is free from the intervention 
of power_ In this sense, his theory seems to be diametri-
cally opposed to the power theory of interest, but when 
what it calls the dynamic state is analysed, it will be seen 
that the formation of interest, as claimed by the power 
theory, constitutes part of it_ Moreover, it seems impossible 
to assert, if this part is left out of account, that interest 
inevitably results from the dynamic state, for while it may 
be possible to explain divergences in profit between enter-
prises-excess profit, so to speak,-it cannot explain the 
general profit or interest_ 
It will thus be seen that the contention that the interest 
owes its existence to a relation of power is at once both a 
sort of productivity theory of interest and another form of 
the dynamic theory_ Because of the imperfect imputation 
of price, which is due to a relation of power, capital has 
value productivity and is necessarily accompanied by dynamic 
profit_ The action of power brings surplus as productivity 
or surplus as the gains of the entrepreneur_ These are 
things which the fundamentals of many theories of interest 
have in common and, moreover, I think I can discover 
the same things in Bohm-Bawerk's theory of interest-rate, 
which is regarded as his most monumental scholastic 
achievement_ 
v 
In my opinion, of the two sections of Bohm-Bawerk's 
theory of interest, the latter section, that is, the theory of 
interest-rate (the neo-wages-fund theory, in a sense) is destined 
to survive for all time_ Regarding the former section, or the 
theory of the causes of interest, it has invited many adverse 
criticisms_ Nor is there any logical connection between that 
section and his theory of interest-rate_ His theory of interest-
rate is formed to the exclusion of the element of time 
preference_ Although this remark may appear to be the 
boldest pronouncement ever made on Bohm-Bawerk's theory, 
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I am not glvmg utterance to it without some warrant. 
While leaving the demonstration of this assertion to a later 
occasion, I shaH now proceed, on the basis of the above 
assumption, to discuss the subject. 
Bohm·Bawerk's theory of interest·rate clearly assumes 
a certain fixed productivity (measure of surplus profit ac· 
cruing from one month's labour by round about production). 
It is a theory of interest based on productivity, though it 
does not demonstrate how the productivity of capital neces· 
sarily arises. Needless to say, Biihm·Bawerk is so trenchant 
in his criticism of the productivity theory of interest that it 
seems that under his criticism this theory has been demo· 
lished, but he himself recognises productivity quite freely. 
He assumes it on the ground that it is an empirical fact. 
Next, he assumes capital and population to be fixed. Under 
these assumptions, he makes clear where natural interest, 
or interest in equilibrium, settles and consequently where 
wages in equilibrium settle. He makes clear how the 
advance payment of wages prevents perfect imputation and 
how consequently interest must needs spring up. How is 
it, then, that interest does spring up in this case? The 
advance payment of wages is the basic condition, and a 
shortage of capital is the cause which is directly responsible 
for bringing interest into existence. A shortage of capital 
here acts as a spoke in the wheel of the imputation of price, 
and surplus and interest accordingly result. Needless to 
say, this mode of expression is different from that employed 
by Bohm-Bawerk. According to him, where the product is 
ohtainable in the future only, the imputation of the superi-
ority of value undergoes transformation. The imputation 
of the price of that portion which is left after interest is 
deducted may testify to the fact of perfect imputation. But 
this represents nothing more or less than the difference 
in the modes of expression employed. To express it in the 
way I have, from my own point of view, by no means 
implies that any distorted construction has been put on 
Bohm-Bawerk's theory. 
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As I have already stated, I propose to explain interest 
by power. I maintain, however, that the method of demon· 
stration to be adopted should be one posterior, not one 
anterior, to the equilibrium theory. In this sense, I take 
my due from Bohm·Bawerk's theory of interest·rate in laying 
down the fundamentals of my argument. I nevertheless 
take the view, as I have already mentioned, that the pro· 
ductivity of capital should not be taken for granted, but, 
that the reason for its inevitable existence should be clearly 
explained. I must also take up the supposition of Bohm-
Bawerk's theory of interest-rate in the stand I take that the 
imputation of this productivity, or, to be more exact, the 
imputation of the price of the product, is not perfect. His 
argument, however, shows, whether he was aware of it or 
not, that a shortage of capital impedes this process of im-
putation. In this regard, I think it necessary to make clear 
why this impediment is inevitable and why, accordingly, it 
does not necessarily depend on the amount of capital. 
As is well-known, Bohm-Bawerk's theory of interest, in 
its essentials, repudiates the action of power. It takes the 
line that even if power does affect interest and wages, either 
accidentally or as a temporary deflection, it cannot exert 
any lasting influence on them. In this respect, there is a 
wide gap between my theory, which emphasises the action 
of power, and the theory of interest of the Bohm-Bawerk 
school. I think, however, that this is the logical conclusion 
of the theoretical construction peculiar to Bohm-Bawerk, and 
that when his premises are properly scrutinised, it will be 
seen that acceptance of his point of view does not debar 
acceptance of my theory_ 
SchmoIler, who is said to hold facts of history in scrupu-
lous regard, declares that wages represent nothing but a 
reflection of a relation of power. That interest and wages 
react on each other and that interest is consequently in-
fluenced by wages are a mere common sense in the theory 
of equilibrium. The fact is incontrovertible that interest and 
wages are influ!"nced by power, but Bohm-Bawerk's theory 
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of interest illustrates the inability of power to influence 
interest. Must we, then, repudiate Biihm·Bawerk's theory 
of interest as inconsistent with known fact? I do not think 
so. It is because of his peculiar assumption that he con-
cludes the inability of power to influence interest_ If his 
assumption is replaced by a condition such as actually rules, 
it is possible to discard his conclusion and it can be demon-
strated that both interest and wages are influenced by 
power. In Biihm-Bawerk's theory, the size of population 
(amount of the labour supplied) and the amount of capital 
(means of subsistence) are fixed. Such being the case, at-
tempts to force up wages or interest by power, for instance, 
must, in the ultimate, end in a reversion to the equilibrium 
point. For, the increase of wages causes unemployment, and 
the increase of interest bring about a shortage of labour. 
This conclusion of the inability of power to influence interest 
is induced by the assumption which fixes the amount of 
capital and the size of population. Biihm-Bawerk himself 
acknowledges the possibility of the increase of interest or 
wages being realised where the capital is increased or the 
labour population changes, though he asserts that in that 
case it is the economic factor (organisation of pure eco-
nomics) that renders it possible and that this contingency 
is bound to arise, regardless of the action of power. 
In this case, however, the question of how far power 
exerts its influence resolves itself into the question of whether 
the impulse to the movement of wages lies on the side of 
power or on the side of the economic factor. If positive 
action or the impulse to force up wages or interest is re-
cognised to lie on the side of power, the economic factor 
will not be motive power, even if it is the condition that 
makes it possible. This is especially so, when, for instance, 
the demand of power, such as, for instance, the forcing up 
of wages, has stimulated such a circumstance_ Stimulation 
of this kind is always present. In the meantime, the size 
of population is directly affected by higher wages. If un-
employment arises, it will check the increase of population 
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or even reduce it. The reduction of the interest-rate by a 
rise in wages will stimulate the increased accumulation of 
capital. If it gives rise to other circumstances tending to 
check this tendency, that is neither here nor there. In reo 
futation of the popular belief that, while it is allowable that 
the increase of wages will bring down the interest·rate, the 
lower interest·rate will lead to a reduction in accumulated 
capital, Schmoller says that such a view does not bear close 
scrutiny; it is not borne out by facts. It is on record, he 
says, that in the days when a very low interest·rate ruled, 
and in a country where the interest·rate was lowest, the big· 
gest increase of capital was witnessed. Nobody, he contends, 
thinks of spending his savings simply because the interest· 
rate is falling. Even though the interest·rate may fall to 
the low level of 1.5 or 2 per cent., the accumulation of 
capital will go on unchecked. Those who wish to live on 
interest in the future will be stimulated, by the lower interest· 
rate, to redoubled efforts to save money. 
My contention in this regard can easily be accepted by 
anyone who adopts the method of considering the equilibrium 
interest and wages as the functions of productivity, capital 
and population the quantity of which must be assumed to 
be affected by power. In short, Biihm·Bawerk's theory of 
interest·rate is inconsistent with the power theory, so long as 
it adheres to the assumption that capital and population are 
fixed, but it can go hand in hand with the power theory, 
if it concedes that capital and population are the functions 
of wages and interest. In this sense, I believe that it is 
possible to re·write Biihm·Bawerk's so·called neo·wages·fund 
theory so as to make it compatible with the power theory. 
As economic theory which is irreconcilable with the in· 
disputable fact of history that wages and interest are deter· 
mined by a relation of power can hardly be expected to serve 
its purpose as such. In order that it may be made to serve 
its purpose as an economic theory, the neo·wages·fund theory 
must discard its own premise in favour of an historical 
premise-a premise given in history, so to speak-so that 
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it can be turned into an historical wages·fund theory. 
Thus, my theory of interest is an historical wages·fund 
theory, a power theory, a productivity theory, and a dynamic 
theory all at the same time. These seemingly conflicting 
theories have fundamentals of truth common to them all, 
and it is my intention to extract these common fundamentals 
from these theories in order to formulate a systematic theory 
on such a basis. 
What I have written above does not cover all the reforms 
that I propose to carry out in reconstructing Bohm·Bawerk's 
theory of interest. In his theory, the element of time in the 
shape of the roundabout period of production constitutes 
the· predominant factor, and all, from the intensity of capital 
to the amount of capital, are analysed into elements of time. 
His effort in this direction is also regarded as another of 
his splendid scholastic achievements. In my view, however, 
this is the outcome of Bohm-Bawerk's excessive abstraction 
in regard to the method of production. I think it imper-
missible to analyse the formation of capital into productive 
periods. I shaH, however, defer a detailed discussion of this 
point to a future occasion. 
YASUMA TAKATA 
